Volume IV No. 2

A publication of the National Association of Theatre Owners

Advertise in In Focus

©

Legislation Could Pose Tough Choices For Employees
Government Asks For Increased
PenaltiesFor Antitrust Violators

by Steven John Fellman
NATO Washington Counsel

Legislation that would increase the maximum penalty for criminal violations of the antitrust laws from a 3-year jail sentence to a 10-year jail sentence has been introduced by senators Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) and Herb Kohl (D-Wis.), respectively chair and ranking minority member of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust.

In addition to the increased jail sentences, this proposed legislation (S. 1797) would substantially increase the fines that the government could levy against defendants guilty of an antitrust violation. The maximum fine for an individual would move up from $350,000 to $1 million. The maximum fine for corporations would be raised from the current $10 million to $100 million. These amounts are in addition to civil penalties and provisions that entitled private plaintiffs to recover treble damages plus attorney fees.

Under S. 1797, the easiest way to mitigate damages is for the corporate parent to become the
“whistle blower” on its division that has engaged in the illegal antitrust activity. By turning in the individuals who actually engaged in the illegal conduct, the parent corporation will eliminate the possibility of treble damages, isolate the “bad guys” and save a potential fortune in damages and attorney’s fees.

The proposed legislation also has an interesting “whistle blower” provision. The bill provides that where a corporation discovers that one of its divisions has been engaging in an antitrust violation, the corporation can limit its potential liability by joining the Department of Justice Corporate Leniency Program and cooperating with the government by providing the Department of Justice with information about the antitrust violation and other companies that may be participating in the violation. If the corporation decided to participate in the leniency program, its potential civil damages would be reduced from treble damages to single damages. However, the whistle blower corporation is also obligated to cooperate with private plaintiffs in litigation against other members of the conspiracy.

If this legislation is enacted, it will have widespread ramifications for the entertainment industry. Today, the entertainment industry is topped by a few mega-corporations with operating divisions which may include motion picture production and distribution, motion picture theatre exhibition, television production, television and radio stations, cable networks, book and record publishing, video production and distribution, theme parks, retail stores, etc. In many of the business sectors described above, antitrust litigation has been prevalent. Government enforcement actions and private treble damage suits are filed on a regular basis in the entertainment industry. As an example, just recently a group of independent producers sued MPAA alleging that the MPAA policy on “screeners” violated the antitrust laws. The United States District Court in New York issued a preliminary injunction enjoining MPAA from continuing the practice.

Antitrust violations generally exist within the confines of defined markets. An antitrust conspiracy involving the record industry would not be relevant to cable TV. Similarly, an antitrust case involving allegations of block booking would have no relevance to the operation of theme parks. Within this context, the whistle blower provisions of S. 1797 become significant.

If a major media giant learns that one of its divisions has engaged in an antitrust conspiracy, its initial question will be, “What type of financial ramifications does this have on the company as a whole?” If the potential for treble damage litigation exists, the parent corporation will have a great incentive to isolate the area of exposure and mitigate damages in any way possible. Under S. 1797, the easiest way to mitigate damages is for the corporate parent to become the “whistle blower” on its division that has engaged in the illegal antitrust activity. By turning in the individuals who actually engaged in the illegal conduct, the parent corporation will eliminate the possibility of treble damages, isolate the “bad guys” and save a potential fortune in damages and attorney’s fees.

If the antitrust violation is a clear violation of both the federal statutes and the corporation’s antitrust compliance program, we have a case of willful misconduct and the corporation clearly is within its rights in acting as a whistle blower. Yet in blowing the whistle, the corporation is exposing high-ranking executives to a jail sentence of up to 10 years.

Antitrust is a complicated area. There may be many “gray” issues involving new technology and application of the antitrust laws to business environments that did not exist when these laws were initially enacted. The antitrust violation may not be willful or intentional.

Assume that I am the president of a division of a major corporation and I attend industry meetings at which certain agreements are made that I believe do not involve antitrust violations. However, over a period of time, I begin to have concerns that the discussions at these meetings and the agreements reached may have crossed the line. I would like to consult antitrust counsel. The parent company has outside antitrust counsel that serves the parent company and each of the operating divisions.

When I go to see our outside corporate antitrust counsel, will I be told that, if the facts I want to discuss indicate that I have engaged in activity which may be illegal, the company will turn me over to the government? Will outside counsel tell me that my own interest may conflict with that of the company and therefore I should consult with private counsel? Will my raising the question with corporate outside counsel force the company into doing its own investigation of the practices of my division?

In the wake of recent federal legislation requiring upgraded corporate responsibility, and the proposed increases in antitrust penalties, we believe that more and more companies will take the position that if your division engages in a willful antitrust violation, you will be turned over to the Department of Justice.

What is the answer? The answer is that each company should have a strong antitrust compliance program and that you as a corporate officer should fully understand areas of potential antitrust exposure. Antitrust is a serious business and, whether S. 1797 is enacted or not, every corporation executive with any antitrust exposure should fully understand how the antitrust laws apply to his or her business.  

 

 

Current Issue Previous Issues Newswire Search  Table of Contents